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Introduction
Hardware performance has seen astonishing advancements with the improving envi-
ronment of information services. The network infrastructure available today is capable 
of sending gigabytes of data in just a few seconds. The downside of such developments 
is that information systems and network infrastructure are more prone to malware-
induced cyber-attacks. According a recent report on malware, Linux-based botnets 
account for the highest proportion of DDoS attacks at 45%, and they pose major threats 
to the information services of companies when installed in embedded devices such as 
Wi-Fi, routers, and NAS (Ferguson and Senie 2000; Baker and Savola 2004).
According to a report by Akamai Technologies (Akamai 2015), Linux-based XOR 
DDoS malware is able to launch DDoS attacks of up to 150 Gbps, and malware-infected 
systems can attack an average of 20 websites per day. To install and execute malware, 
attackers acquire the administrative rights of a vulnerable system and run a Shell com-
mand in order to install a malware program containing a rootkit function, which allows 
them to hide their presence.
Abstract 
Large-scale network environments require effective detection and response methods 
against DDoS attacks. Depending on the advancement of IT infrastructure such as the 
server or network equipment, DDoS attack traffic arising from a few malware-infected 
systems capable of crippling the organization’s internal network has become a signifi-
cant threat. This study calculates the frequency of network-based packet attributes and 
analyzes the anomalies of the attributes in order to detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks. 
Also, a method is proposed for the effective detection of malware infection systems 
triggering IP-spoofed DDoS attacks on an edge network. Detection accuracy and per-
formance of the collected real-time traffic on a core network is analyzed thru the use of 
the proposed algorithm, and a prototype was developed to evaluate the performance 
of the algorithm. As a result, DDoS attacks on the internal network were detected in 
real-time and whether or not IP addresses were spoofed was confirmed. Detecting 
hosts infected by malware in real-time allowed the execution of intrusion responses 
before stoppage of the internal network caused by large-scale attack traffic.
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As demonstrated above, the development of IT has resulted in threats unseen in the 
past and corporate information service environments are at a greater risk than ever. 
XOR DDoS malware, one of the most threatening types of malware that can infect 
Linux-based systems, launches massive IP-spoofed DDoS attacks that paralyze internal 
networks. Companies have selected Linux-based systems over the more vulnerable Win-
dows operating system as a method of security enforcement, but the various techniques 
and tools developed by attackers are posing significant threats to businesses.
Past research has focused on the detection of outbound-to-inbound DDoS attacks 
(Duan et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2007; Feinstein et al. 2003) or the detection of attacks by 
analyzing information retrieved from botnet agents in internal systems (François et al. 
2011; Abu Rajab et  al. 2006). However, few studies exist on the detection of network-
based attacks when the internal network is under massive volumes of DDoS traffic 
caused by the IP-spoofed DDoS malware or other infections. For instance, when a DDoS 
attack occurs due to a malware-infected system in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), SYN 
flooding takes place in the network section from the host system to the security sys-
tem. The depletion of network resources disrupts network services in the corresponding 
bandwidth. Rapid detection and response to malware-infected systems is the most effec-
tive way of ensuring the availability of the internal network (Perdisci et al. 2013; Beverly 
et al. 2009; Bremler-Barr and Levy 2005).
This paper applies the DDoS malware finder (DMF) algorithm in order to detect 
abnormalities when the host of an internal network is infected with DDoS malware 
based on Spoofed IP Address and launches massive volumes of DDoS attacks. The DMF 
algorithm derives patterns from feature information of DDoS malware based on Spoofed 
IP Address and applies the matching rule to enable real-time detection. Malware-
infected systems are identified with reference to the DMF table.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: second section describes the background 
of the study and related work, third section contains the motivation and challenge, 
fourth section gives the system overview, fifth section presents the system model, and 
sixth section is the evaluation. The last section is the conclusion.
Background and related work
Background
Malware Must Die team members first detected XOR DDoS in September 2014. A Tro-
jan malware was used to hijack Linux machines in order to build a botnet for DDoS 
(Akamai 2015).
The bandwidth of DDoS attacks coming from the XOR DDoS botnet has ranged 
from a few gigabits per second to 150Gbps. The botnet has attacked up to 20 targets 
per day, 90% of which are in Asia. Two DDoS attacks were caused by the XOR DDoS 
botnet on the weekend of August 22–23. One of the attacks measured nearly 50 Gbps 
and the other reached nearly 100 Gbps. XOR DDoS is an example of attackers building 
botnets from Linux systems instead of Windows-based machines. Other recent exam-
ples of Linux-based malware include the Spike DDoS toolkit and IptabLes and IptabLex 
malware. There is an increasing number of Linux vulnerabilities for malicious actors to 
target, such as the heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability found earlier this year in 
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the GNU C Library. However, XOR DDoS itself does not exploit a specific vulnerability 
(Arbor Networks 2015; Akamai 2015).
Related work
Although a significant amount of literature has been produced on botnet detection, bot-
net detection approaches using flow analysis techniques have only emerged in the last 
few years.
Zhao et al. (2013) proposed a new approach to detect botnet activity based on traffic 
behavior analysis by classifying network traffic behavior using machine learning. Traffic 
behavior analysis methods do not depend on the packets payload, which means that they 
can work with encrypted network communication protocols. Network traffic informa-
tion can usually be easily retrieved from various network devices without affecting sig-
nificantly network performance or service availability. The proposed approach detects 
botnet activity by classifying behavior based on time intervals.
BotHunter (John and Tafvelin 2007) consists of intrusion detection system (IDS) com-
ponents, used to observe inbound and outbound traffic flow, and a dialog correlation 
engine that generates the flow of bot infections. The two BotHunter plugins are the Sta-
tistical sCan Anomaly Detection Engine (SCADE) and the Statistical payLoad Anomaly 
Detection Engine (SLADE).
SCADE performs inbound scan detection and outbound scan detection by categoriz-
ing anomalies as high-severity (HS) or low-severity (LS). SLADE, based on a byte-dis-
tribution payload detection technique, inspects the payloads of all packets sent by the 
service being monitored and provides warnings when the N-gram frequency exceeds the 
normal range (Gu et al. 2008).
While BotHunter offers a remote repository for users to evaluate bot activities and col-
lect information, it is difficult to detect anomalies in bots that use encrypted channels in 
order to communicate with the Command and Control (C&C) server and stealth-scan-
ning bots. Since bot infection is determined based on the behavioral patterns of modi-
fied bots, bots with signatures updated from variations in traffic patterns are also not 
easy to identify. To resolve these issues, it is necessary for the server to automatically 
collect and analyze patterns, as well as to constantly renew them (Tegeler et al. 2012; Gu 
et al. 2008).
Zeidanloo et al. (2010) proposed a botnet detection approach based on the monitor-
ing of network traffic characteristics in a similar way to BotMiner. In their work, a three 
stages process of filtering, malicious activity detection and traffic monitoring is used to 
group bots by their group behavior. The proposed approach divides the concept of flows 
into time periods of 6 h and clusters these flow intervals with known malicious activity. 
The effects of different flow interval durations were not presented, and the accuracy of 
the approach is unknown (Zhao et al. 2013).
Wang et al. (2009) presented a detection approach of peer-to-peer based botnets by 
observing the stability of control flows in initial time intervals of 10 min. They developed 
an algorithm which measures the stability of flows and exploits the property that bots 
exhibit similar behavior in their command search and perform these tasks independently 
of each other and frequently. They show that by varying parameters in their algorithm, 
Page 4 of 20Seo and Lee  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1878 
they were able to classify 98% of Storm C&C data as stable, though a large percentage of 
non-malicious peer-to-peer traffic were also classified as such (Zhao et al. 2013).
Motivation and challenge
Recently, there has been an increase in attackers gaining the administrative rights of 
Linux-based systems by exploiting web service vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection, 
OpenSSL, and file uploads. The attackers access the C&C server or malware distribution 
site with their administrative status, and execute the wget or curl command in order to 
perform a forced installation of the downloaded malware. Figure 1 shows the installa-
tion of the malware program in the/etc./rc.3d and/etc./rc5.d directories after a reboot 
of a system infected with malware. The installed malware communicates with the C&C 
server and prepares to launch attacks (Sakib and Huang 2016; Park and Lee 2001).
Table 1 is an example of a SYN flooding payload caused by an IP-spoofed DDoS attack 
in an actual information service environment.
The SYN flooding attacks are launched by the infected system on an external, unspeci-
fied target and IP spoofing makes it more difficult to detect the source of the infection. 
If the infected system behind the attacks cannot be efficiently identified, the bandwidth 
of the internal network becomes consumed by DDoS attacks, resulting in a disruption of 
network services (Liu and Bi 2015; Freiling et al. 2005). Figure 2 shows the detection of 
DDoS attacks generated by a system infected with malware.
Figure  3 shows the monitoring of the Network Management System (NMS) when 
infected by IP-spoofed DDoS malware. The screen shows the DMZ network, which 
provides services with an average traffic of 600  Mbps. As shown, the infected system 
Fig. 1 Installation of XOR DDoS malware
Table 1 Capturing network traffic by XOR DDoS
06:05:24.260515 IP x.x.x.x.7318 > y.y.y.y.80: Flags [S], seq 479609867:479610763,win65535,length896
06:05:24.260540 IP x.x.x.x.2104 > y.y.y.y.80: Flags [S], seq 137948748:137949644,win65535,length896
06:05:24.260560 IP x.x.x.x.58852 > y.y.y.y.80: Flags [S], seq 3856952941:3856953837,win65535,length 896
···
06:05:24.260574 IP x.x.x.x.4375 > y.y.y.y.80: Flags [S], seq 286734425:286735321,win65535,length896
06:05:24.260583 IP x.x.x.x.62129 > y.y.y.y.80: Flags [SE], seq 4071711351:4071712247,win65535,length896
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generated DDoS traffic of 2  Gbps. The unexpected increase in traffic, exceeding the 
1 Gbps limit, caused the failure of the entire network.
Ultimately, the most effective way of ensuring network availability is the rapid detection 
and response to systems that generate huge volumes of traffic after being infected with 
IP-spoofed DDoS malware. This is also related to the reliability of information services.
One method of preventing malware infection is to install vaccine programs for all Linux-
based systems, but this is not the best solution for companies. Installing vaccines on all Linux 
systems is not only expensive, but also requires the software license to be renewed each year.
Another method is to install anti-bot programs to detect malicious bots in the local 
system. However, anti-bot programs may be impossible to install depending on hard-
ware performance and additional licenses have to be purchased if new hosts are added. 
As illustrated in Fig. 4, it is important to consider a network-based approach to malware 
detection in order to overcome the aforementioned issues.
Fig. 2 DDoS attacks detected by intrusion detection system
Fig. 3 Monitoring of network traffic by XOR DDoS attack
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By analyzing an actual system infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware, the following 
features were identified. First, massive volumes of SYN flooding attacks were generated 
by creating more than two million SYN packets per minute. Second, IP spoofing was 
performed in order to conceal the source of the attacks. The list of attacked systems was 
downloaded from the C&C server and periodically updated for the next series of attacks. 
Figure 5 shows the IP address and port number of IP-spoofed DDoS attacks.
This study proposes a method that can detect network-based IP-spoofed DDoS attacks 
and efficiently identify malware-infected systems.
System overview
The DMF algorithm analyzes the feature information of the traffic header in order to 
detect IP-spoofed DDoS malware. The three phases are extraction, analysis, and detec-
tion. In the first phase, the attack features of the IP-spoofed DDoS malware are ana-
lyzed after categorizing the internal network by service area and collecting real-time 
network traffic. Based on the Layer 3 switch, network services are categorized into user 
Fig. 4 DDoS detection based on network
Fig. 5 IP address and port number of IP-Spoofed DDoS attacks
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bandwidth, server farm bandwidth, and branch office. Traffic collection is configured in 
port mirroring and a DMF table is created by extracting feature information, including 
the IP address and MAC address of the Ethernet headers, the current time, and the time 
interval. In Table 2, the columns specify the attribute information of a DMF table.
In the second phase, the proposed detection algorithm is applied and statistical fea-
tures are analyzed in order to detect IP-spoofed DDoS malware. The extracted IP 
addresses and MAC addresses from Ethernet headers of real-time traffic are compared 
with the attribute information provided in the DMF table to determine if IP-spoofed 
DDoS malware infection has occurred. Figure 6 shows the process for detection of IP-
spoofed DDoS malware.
The DMF table consists of the attribute information of traffic headers. The time inter-
val is calculated if there is a match between the IP addresses and MAC addresses of real-
time traffic with the property values in the DMF DB. Time-interval values are used to 
check for IP-spoofed DDoS malware infection.
Instead of referring to traffic payload, the proposed algorithm relies on the feature 
information of the IP-spoofed DDoS malware for malware detection.
System model
The purpose of the experiment is to detect malware-infected systems after detecting IP-
spoofed DDoS based on an analysis of real-time traffic. This section examines the system 
model for the proposed method.
Gathering on the network traffic
To implement the DMF algorithm, port mirroring is configured at the Layer 3 switch. 
The reason for the port mirroring configuration is to detect malware infection based on 
an analysis of traffic routed through the network equipment and to identify infected sys-
tems. Figure 7 shows the schematic diagram for real-time network traffic collection.
Table 2 Attribute information of a DMF table
Attribute Type Feature data Description
SN VARCHAR(20) S00001 Sequence number to traffic
SGN VARCHAR(20) G00001 Same group number with the same destination IP
Attribute Info.
 SRCIP VARCHAR(15) 58.203.201.36 Source IP
 SRCPORT VARCHAR(6) 5312 Source Port
 DSTIP VARCHAR(15) 211.106.66.102 Destination IP
 DSTPORT VARCHAR(6) 80 Destination Port
 MAC VARCHAR(17) D0-27-88-47-15-4B Media access control (MAC)
 PT VARCHAR(8) TCP Protocol
 AT DATE 2016.08.12 07:05:28 Destination IP connection time
 TIN FLOAT 2 s Interval from previous traffic
 CND INTEGER 28 hit Destination IP connection hits
 RATD FLOAT 136 s Interval from previous traffic connected to destination IP
 CNTI INTEGER 12 hit Hits to the destination IP over 3 min
 STATE VARCHAR(20) Abnormal Traffic anomaly status
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Extraction on the feature information
As shown in Fig.  7, the attribute information by TCP/IP and Ethernet header are 
extracted from the collected traffic and used as basic data in generating the DMF DB. 
Figure 8 shows the protocol stack used in extracting the feature information from real-
time traffic.
As shown in Fig. 8, the headers of traffic flowing out of the internal network are used 
to extract feature information. Figure 9 shows the process of collecting SYN packets sent 
by the server farm and extracting the feature information from the collected traffic.
Creation of the DMF table
The DMF table is used to detect DDoS attacks in real-time traffic and contains feature 
values that are useful in identifying malware-infected systems. The procedures for gen-
erating the DMF table are as follows:
Fig. 6 Process for detection of IP-spoofed DDoS malware
Fig. 7 Collection and analysis of network packets
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  • The SN field of the DMF table represents the traffic sequence and the SGN field 
means the number of the group connecting to the same destination IP.
  • The traffic header IP address and MAC address is extracted and stored in the SRCIP, 
DSTIP, and MAC fields for the DMF table. The communication protocol between 
the two hosts and the access time are also stored.
  • The TIN field represents the interval between previous traffic and current traffic.
  • The CND field represents the connection hits to the destination IP and the RATD 
field represents the reconnect interval of the destination IP.
  • The STATE field is categorized into two types. If the TIN field value and RATD 
value are zero and the CNTI field divided by 180 s is ≤1 then the field value is set as 
“abnormal”. All other instances are set as “normal”. Table 3 shows the algorithm for 
creating the DMF table.
Figure 10 shows an example of the data stored in the DMF table.
Analysis of feature information
Malware-infected hosts receive attack commands from the C&C server or leaks impor-
tant data to the C&C server. Also, they receive DDoS attack commands from the C&C 
server or generate large scale IP-spoofed DDoS attack traffic at a specified time. Accord-
ing to the performance of the host and the network bandwidth, the DDoS traffic gen-
erated at this time can cripple the internal network and makes it extremely difficult to 
detect IP-spoofed malware-infected hosts. The proposed method to detect the DDoS 
attack is to use the DMF table in order to analyze the traffic generation time and genera-
tion frequency, thereby determining if it is IP-spoofed by using the IP address and MAC 
address. To detect malware-infected hosts, the connection times to the MAC address 
and destination IP address and connection frequency are used. Figure 11 shows a DMF 
table with the analysis results of the attribute information of the network traffic.
Fig. 8 Protocol stack for extraction of feature information
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Detection of IP‑spoofed DDoS attack
In order to detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks, attribute information collected from the 
core network is analyzed. Attribute information is stored in the DMF table and, as seen 
in Fig. 11, the attribute’s relative information is used to detect attacks. Table 4 shows the 
algorithm to detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks.
Figure  12 shows the timeline of traffic information generated on a network when a 
malware-infected host executes an IP-spoofed DDoS attack.
As shown in Fig.  12, analysis results of the attributes of IP-spoofed DDoS malware 
showed that it was periodically communicating with the C&C server and the attack tar-
get was downloaded from the C&C server and updated. The IP-spoofed DDoS attack 
was powerful enough to cause an outage to the core network in a gigabit Ethernet 
environment.
Finding of a system infected by IP‑spoofed DDoS malware
Upon detecting the IP-spoofed DDoS attack with the proposed methodology, it is nec-
essary to find the malware-infected host and eliminate the cause. Because of IP address 
spoofing, it is impossible to block a particular IP address in the firewall, and even if we 
were to block a range of IP addresses, the internal network would either come to a halt 
or have extreme delays as a result of the large volume traffic generated by the malware. 
Therefore, it is necessary to quickly quarantine the host that is generating the DDoS 
attacks to an edge network.
IP-spoofed DDoS attacks create tampered IP address packets on a host infected by 
malicious code and utilizes the maximum performance of the host to generate large vol-
ume traffic. According to the DDoS attack, network resources are consumed and because 
the web services and intranet services are not executed normally, resources are depleted 
as time goes by. Table 5 shows an algorithm to effectively detect malware-infected hosts.
Fig. 9 Extraction of feature information
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Intrusion response on infected system
When a DDoS attack manifests in the internal network, it is necessary to detect the 
intruding system and respond before it consumes all of the internal network’s band-
width. Also, it is necessary to understand the intrusion cause and secure the audit trail 
Table 3 Creation of DMF table
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in order to eliminate any weak spots. The proposed method is for network forensics to 
understand the traffic flow and to use the attribute values of the DMF table to analyze 
the malware-infected system and its attack tendencies. Figure  13 shows the network 
forensics execution plan using the DMF table.
Evaluation
The testbed environment is organized as shown in Fig. 14 in order to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the proposed algorithm, detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks, and identify mal-
ware-infected systems. This section describes the differences between the proposed 
method and existing technology and evaluates the efficiency of detecting local hosts 
infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware.
 The test environment for the assessment of the proposed algorithm was a Gigabit Eth-
ernet network environment with IP-spoofed DDoS malware installed in the server farm 
of the DMZ network. For the installation of the proposed algorithm, the system configu-
ration included an Intel i7 CPU with eight cores, 16 GB of RAM, and 2Tbyte of HDD. 
The Java programming language was used to program the prototype in order to verify 
the performance of the proposed algorithm.
Fig. 10 Feature information of collected traffic
Fig. 11 Analysis of feature information using DMF table
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Table 4 Detection of IP-spoofed DDoS attack
Fig. 12 Timeline of an IP-spoofed DDoS attack in a malware-infected System
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Comparison of the proposed method and the intrusion detection system
When malware is installed via zero-day vulnerability or drive by download, the security 
system can no longer guarantee the stability of the internal network. Host-based anti-
malware solutions could possibly be effective, but applying it to large-scale networks 
poses administrative and technical difficulties. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can 
detect network based IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and effectively detect malware-infected 
hosts. Table 6 compares the performance of the proposed algorithm and the IDS.
Results of the verification of the proposed algorithm and the IDS on a testing environ-
ment showed that both were able to adequately detect DDoS attacks; however, the IDS 
could not detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and malware-infected hosts.
Figure 15a is the result of DDoS attacks detected by the IDS, and Fig. 15b shows the 
time that DDoS attacks were detected. Figure 15c shows the results of IP-spoofed DDoS 
attacks detected by prototype implemented with the proposed algorithm. Figure  15d 
shows the detection times of the IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and false positives in the test 
environment.
Table 5 Finding of a system infected by malware
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Detection time of IP‑spoofed DDoS malware
The purpose of this study is to detect and rapidly respond to malware before network 
resources are depleted when massive volumes of DDoS attacks are launched by a sys-
tem infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware. Tests were performed using the proposed 
method, and the detection times of DDoS attacks are as shown in Fig. 16.
Figure 16 shows the detection time for IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and malware-infected 
systems. Graph A represents the time at which IP-spoofed DDoS attacks occur due to 
the local host being infected with malware, while Graph B is the discovery time of when 
the local host has been infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware.
The average detection time under the proposed algorithm for IP-spoofed DDoS 
attacks in the local host was 98 s; the longest time was 179 s. Figure 17 shows the detec-
tion mechanism for DDoS attacks. The proposed algorithm analyzes the headers of real-
time traffic to detect IP-spoofed DDoS attacks.
Fig. 13 Network forensic using DMF table
Fig. 14 Diagram of experiment environment
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Figure 18 shows the packet information collected by the DMF. The average time taken 
to detect systems infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware was 444 s; the longest time 
was 600 s.
Accuracy
To assess the accuracy of detecting malware-infected systems using the proposed 
method, tests were carried out under the test environment in Fig.  14. Accuracy tests 
were performed under the following conditions:
  • Installation of malware in the test server and launch of IP-spoofed DDoS attacks.
  • Analysis of attack features and false positives after varying the IP address of the test 
server.
  • Analysis of attack features and false positives after replacing the server hardware.
The accuracy of detecting malware-infected systems was calculated as follows:
The experimental results are presented in Table 7.
The accuracy of detecting systems infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware was 
assessed under the test environment described above, and averages were obtained 
from 1000 runs. The detection accuracy was approximately 98% and 12 false positives 
occurred during the experiment. False positives were detected when there was an error 
with the network configuration or when ARP spoofing occurred.
Effectiveness
Past research has focused on the detection of outbound-to-inbound DDoS attacks or 
malware-infected hosts in internal network. However, various challenges have yet to 
be addressed for detecting and responding to inbound-to-outbound DDoS attacks 
launched by malware-infected local hosts. If DDoS attacks originating from local hosts 
cannot be effectively resolved, normal network services become difficult due to band-
width exhaustion. This experiment found that the malware-infected system generated 
more than one million SYN flooding packets per minute and the network traffic was 
approximately 64 GB.
Agents do not have to be separately installed in order to detect malware-infected sys-
tems using the proposed method, and widespread detection is possible for malware-
infected systems running on networks. As shown in Fig. 19, the average time taken to 
detect a system infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware was 542 s.






Table 6 The performance comparison of the proposed algorithm and IDS
Performance Proposed algorithm Intrusion detection system (IDS)
Detection of DDoS attack Support Support
Detection of IP-spoofed DDoS attack Support Not supported
Detection of system infected by malware Support Not supported
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False positives
This proposed method enables the effective detection of IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and 
malware-infected systems. False positives were detected in two cases. In the first case, 
errors in network configuration after server replacement caused anomalous traffic. In 
Mean time for intrusion response (MTIR) = detection time of IP spoofing DDoS attack
+ detection time of infected system
Fig. 15 A comparative analysis of the proposed algorithm and IDS
Fig. 16 Test result (detection time of infected system by malware)
Page 18 of 20Seo and Lee  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1878 
the second case, changes in the MAC address under ARP spoofing resulted in anoma-
lous traffic. In actual information system environments, errors in network configuration 
lead to problems in communication, thereby allowing them to be identified before oper-
ating information services. The detection of ARP spoofing indicates an intrusion of the 
internal network and adequate measures must be taken to remove the malware.
Conclusion
A key factor in enhancing corporate reliability is the stability of information services 
provided through the Internet. While various security solutions are available today, 
DDoS attacks still pose significant threats to information service providers and security 
administrators.
When a system infected with IP-spoofed DDoS malware launches massive volumes of 
DDoS traffic in the internal network, a fundamental solution is to detect and remove the 
malware-infected system. This is because flooding packets generated by the local host 
affect network communications using the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) as well as the 
Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP). A real-world example is the 6-h halting of network 
services by an Internet service provider under an IP-spoofed DDoS attack despite being 
equipped with various security solutions, such as DDoS countering equipment and 
an intrusion prevention system (Strayer et  al. 2006; Stone-Gross et  al. 2009). If DDoS 
Fig. 17 Detection of IP-spoofed DDoS attacks using DMF algorithm
Fig. 18 Packet information collected by DMF
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attacks are not detected in advance and responded to, there is likely to be a negative 
impact on the reliability of information services provided by such companies.
Using the algorithm proposed in this paper, it is possible to effectively detect IP-
spoofed DDoS attacks and rapidly respond to malware-infected systems. The proposed 
algorithm derives patterns from features of IP-spoofed DDoS malware and matches 
information in the headers of real-time traffic with DMF table property values to detect 
IP-spoofed DDoS attacks and malware-infected systems. The efficiency of the proposed 
algorithm was demonstrated through various experiments and its applicability to actual 
operating environments was verified under a testbed environment.
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Table 7 Accuracy of experiment result
Error ratio Accuracy (%) Explanation
12:1000 98.8 TP rate = 0.988, FP = 12
8:600 98.7 TP rate = 0.987, FP = 8
2:400 99.5 TP rate = 0.995, FP = 2
1:100 99.0 TP rate = 0.99, FP = 1
0:50 100 TP rate = 1, FP = 0
Fig. 19 Time interval to detect the system infected by malware
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